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FISHER, Circuit Judge. 
Defendant Michael Eugene Begin appeals from a sentence imposed by the United 
States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania.  For the reasons stated 
below, we will affirm. 
I. 
We write principally for the parties, who are familiar with the factual context and 
legal history of this case.  Therefore, we will set forth only those facts that are necessary 
to our analysis. 
On October 12, 2010, Begin pled guilty to charges related to his use of the internet 
and a cellular phone to send sexual messages and photographs to a minor in order to 
persuade her to have sex with him.  Prior to sentencing, the United States Probation 
Office prepared a presentence report (“PSR”), which categorized his offense level at 32 
and his criminal history category at IV, resulting in a guidelines range of 168 to 210 
months in prison.  The government filed a motion for an upward departure from the 
advisory guidelines range, arguing that the recommended range underrepresented the 
severity of Begin’s criminal history.  Begin, on the other hand, sought a downward 
variance based upon the disparity between his guidelines range and the sentence that he 
would have faced in either state or federal court had he actually committed statutory rape. 
At Begin’s sentencing hearing, the District Court heard testimony and oral 
argument regarding Begin’s criminal history.  Based upon the testimony presented, the 
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Court found, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Begin had engaged in several 
sexual assaults for which the PSR had not accounted, two of which involved victims 
under the age of sixteen.  App. 154.  It also described the details of Begin’s assault on a 
seven-year-old when he was sixteen years of age as “particularly egregious.”  App. 154.  
The Court then granted the government’s motion for an upward departure, describing 
Begin’s criminal history as “lengthy, continuous” and “primarily focused on sexually 
assaulting minor females.”  App. 154-55.  It increased Begin’s criminal history category 
to V, making the applicable Guidelines range 188 to 235 months imprisonment, and 
made a further upward departure to reflect the seriousness of the sexual abuse in which 
Begin had engaged.  After finding that the appropriate range for Begin spanned from 188 
to 240 months of imprisonment, the Court sentenced Begin to a 240-month term of 
imprisonment.  It found that the sentence was “sufficient but not greater than necessary,” 
and “adequately addresse[d] the nature and circumstances of this offense, as well as the 
history and background of the Defendant.”  App. 168.  It further noted that “[t]his 
sentence also takes into account the need to avoid unwarranted disparities in sentencing 
among defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of similar conduct.”  
App. 169-70. 
Begin timely appealed his sentence and conviction to this Court, arguing that his 
sentence was procedurally unsound because the District Court failed to discuss, or even 
rule on, his request for a downward variance in light of “the need to avoid unwarranted 
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sentence disparities among defendants with similar records who have been found guilty 
of similar conduct.”  United States v. Begin, 696 F.3d 405, 411 (3d Cir. 2012).  After 
concluding that only Begin’s federal-federal disparity argument had “colorable legal 
merit,” we held that the District Court had failed to make a sufficient record to 
demonstrate its consideration of that argument.  Id. at 414.  We observed that a “rote 
recitation of § 3553(a)(6) is insufficient to permit us to review the Court’s resolution of 
Begin’s disparity arguments.”  Id.  We therefore vacated Begin’s sentence as 
“procedurally unsound” and remanded for resentencing.  Id. 
The resentencing hearing was held on January 22, 2013.  After hearing oral 
argument from both parties regarding Begin’s variance request, the District Court stated: 
I think counsel on both sides did a good job.  And, Mr. Patton, I commend 
you for the points you raise here, but I must say that I, ultimately, cannot 
agree with changing the sentence.  As I said before, I granted the 
government’s upward departure motion and, ultimately, determined that the 
appropriate offense level was 32 and the appropriate criminal history 
category was Roman numeral V.  Thus, making the applicable Guideline 
range one hundred eighty-eight to two hundred thirty-five months of 
imprisonment.  And then added another upward departure on that, making 
it ultimately, two hundred forty months . . . I’m going to deny here the 
request from Mr. Patton for a downward variance. 
 
App. 197.  The Court also noted: 
We further believe the extensiveness of his overall criminal history under-
represent [sic] his actual history when compared to similar defendants.  
Finally, we believe that the defendant’s criminal history does seriously 
under-represent the likelihood that he will commit other crimes.  His 
criminal history is lengthy, continuous, and primarily focused on assaulting 
minor females . . . I believe now that the sentence does take into account 
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the need to avoid unwarranted disparities in sentencing among defendants 
with similar records that have been found guilty of similar conduct. 
 
App. 206-07.  It then re-imposed the same sentence.  Begin’s second timely notice of 
appeal to this Court followed. 
II. 
The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231.  We have appellate 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
We review a district court’s sentencing decision for an abuse of discretion, which 
proceeds in two stages of analysis.  United States v. Tomko, 562 F.3d 558, 567 (3d Cir. 
2009) (en banc).  We first review for procedural error, ensuring that the district court:  
(1) correctly calculated the defendant’s advisory Guidelines range; (2) appropriately 
considered any motions for a departure under the Guidelines; and (3) gave meaningful 
consideration to the sentencing factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).  United States v. 
Wright, 642 F.3d 148, 152 (3d Cir. 2011).  If the sentencing decision passes the first stage 
of review, we then consider the substantive reasonableness of the decision.  United States 
v. Levinson, 543 F.3d 190, 195 (3d Cir. 2008).  Our substantive review focuses on the 
totality of the circumstances.  Tomko, 562 F.3d at 567. 
III. 
A. 
Begin argues that the District Court’s resentencing was procedurally unsound 
because, although the Court ruled on Begin’s downward variance request, it failed to give 
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“thorough and meaningful consideration” to his argument.  Specifically, Begin argues 
that, on remand, this Court was looking for an answer to why the sentence for a crime that 
was not consummated should be greater than the sentence for a crime that was 
consummated.  We disagree. 
When a district court sentences a defendant, it “must produce a record sufficient to 
demonstrate its rational and meaningful consideration of the § 3553(a) factors.”  Begin, 
696 F.3d at 411 (citing United States v. Merced, 603 F.3d 203, 215-16 (3d Cir. 2010)).  
The record, taken in its entirety, must make clear that the district court “has considered 
the parties’ arguments and has a reasoned basis for exercising [its] own legal 
decisionmaking authority.”  Merced, 603 F.3d at 215-16 (quoting Rita v. United States, 
551 U.S. 338, 356 (2007)).  It is not necessary that the district court “raise every 
conceivable issue on its own initiative” or even “discuss every argument raised by a 
litigant if an argument is clearly without merit.”  Id. at 215.  “However, if  a party raises a 
colorable argument about the applicability of one of the § 3553(a) factors, the district 
court may not ignore it.”  Id.  Thus, “the court must acknowledge and respond to any 
properly presented sentencing argument which has colorable legal merit and a factual 
basis.”  United States v. Ausburn, 502 F.3d 313, 329 (3d Cir. 2007).  While the court’s 
response to each argument need not be perfect, Merced, 603 F.3d at 215, “a rote 
statement that the court has considered each of the § 3553(a) factors is not a sufficient 
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response to a specific colorable argument.”  Begin, 696 F.3d at 411 (citing United States 
v. Jackson, 467 F.3d 834, 841 (3d Cir. 2006)). 
After reviewing the record, we conclude that the District Court gave thorough and 
meaningful consideration to Begin’s downward variance argument at the resentencing 
hearing.  When the District Court first sentenced Begin, it merely reiterated § 3553(a)(6), 
stating:  “This sentence also takes into account the need to avoid unwarranted disparities 
in sentencing among defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of 
similar conduct.”  App. 169-70.  This statement alone, without adequate justification, was 
insufficient to allow proper appellate review of Begin’s disparity argument.  We did not, 
as Begin argues, remand the case for the District Court to address, specifically, why the 
sentence for a crime that was not consummated should be greater than the sentence for a 
crime that was consummated.  Rather, we sought a clear justification on the record as to 
how the Court considered § 3553(a)(6), which it articulated at the resentencing hearing. 
After hearing oral argument and recessing for ten minutes, the District Court 
addressed each party’s arguments, granted the government’s request for an upward 
departure, and denied Begin’s request for a downward variance.  In considering 
§ 3553(a)(6), the Court distinguished Begin’s extensive criminal history from that of 
similar defendants, identifying specific instances of Begin’s “particularly egregious” 
conduct.  In this regard, it highlighted its belief that “the extensiveness of [Begin’s] 
overall criminal history under-represent[ed] his actual history when compared to similar 
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defendants.”  App. 206-07.  For that reason, the Court denied Begin’s request for a 
downward variance, instead imposing multiple enhancements to the guidelines range.  
Our review of the record reveals that it gave thorough and meaningful consideration to 
Begin’s downward variance argument at the resentencing hearing.  Because Begin 
disputes only the District Court’s analysis of § 3553(a)(6), and the record does not 
indicate any other procedural errors in its resentencing, we conclude that the resentencing 
was not procedurally unreasonable. 
Since the District Court’s sentencing decision passed the first stage of review, we 
now turn to the substantive reasonableness of the decision.  Levinson, 543 F.3d at 195.  
Here, the Court clearly identified numerous instances in Begin’s past that justified its 
upward departure from the advisory guidelines, describing his past conduct as 
“particularly egregious” and highlighting Begin’s criminal past compared to similar 
defendants.  Because we cannot say that “no reasonable sentencing court would have 
imposed the same sentence on [Begin] for the reasons the [D]istrict [C]ourt provided,” 
Tomko, 562 F.3d at 568, we conclude that the sentence was substantively reasonable. 
IV. 
For the reasons set forth above, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment of 
conviction and resentencing. 
